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a b s t r a c t
For facilitating the confidential transaction with delegation such as on-line proxy auction
and business contract signing by an authorized proxy, we propose an efficient proxy
signcryption scheme from pairings. Our scheme allows an original signer to delegate his
signing power to a proxy one such that the latter can signcrypt a plaintext on behalf of
the former. The signcrypted message can only be decrypted by a designated recipient
who is also responsible for verifying the recovered proxy signature. To deal with a later
dispute over repudiation, the designated recipient can easily announce the ordinary proxy
signature for public verification without extra computational efforts. To guarantee the
realistic applicability, we demonstrate that our scheme outperforms previous works in
terms of functionalities and computational efficiency. Moreover, the security requirement
of confidentiality against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA2) and that of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-
message attacks (EF-CMA) are proved in random oracle models.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The first public key cryptosystem was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [1] in 1976. Since then, public key systems have
been widely used in many kinds of fields. In essence, the public key encryption and the digital signature scheme [2,3] are
two commonly applied techniques for assuring the communication security. Nevertheless, with the coming of gradually
complex business applications, such as the proxy delegation, the on-line credit card transaction, the contract signing, etc.,
traditional cryptographic techniques are not sufficient to deal with these specific application requirements.
In 1996, Mambo et al. [4,5] introduced the notion of proxy signature. A proxy signature scheme allows the proxy signer
authorized by the original signer to generate a proxy signature on behalf on the latter such that everyone can verify the proxy
signature. It can be seen that proxy signature schemes effectively solve the problem of proxy delegation in an organization.
Generally speaking, the proxy delegation can be categorized into four sorts including the full delegation [4,5], the partial
delegation [4,5], the delegation by warrant [6,7] and the partial delegation by warrant [8]. Among these delegations, it is
believed that the last one is a better alternative, since it inherits the merits of partial delegation and delegation by warrant.
Besides, certifying the warrant and verifying the signature can be simultaneously carried out within one step.
Consider the applications where we have to simultaneously fulfill the security requirements of confidentiality, integrity,
authenticity and non-repudiation [9,10], such as the on-line credit card transaction and the contract signing. In 1997,
Zheng [11] proposed a so-called signcryption scheme which is suitable for these applications. A signcryption scheme only
allows the designated recipient to verify the signer’s signature instead of everyone for the purpose of confidentiality.
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In 1998, Petersen and Michels [12] also proposed another signcryption variant modified from an authenticated encryption
scheme. Yet, He andWu [13] pointed out that their scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack. To deal with the later dispute
that the signer repudiates his generated signature, Zheng [14] introduced an arbitration mechanism by using the zero-
knowledge protocol [15,16]. However, the arbitration mechanism is inefficient for that it will increase extra computation
efforts and communication overheads. In 1998, Bao and Deng [17] addressed an efficient way to handle the repudiation
dispute. Their scheme enables the designated recipient to convert the signcrypted message into an ordinary signature for
the public verification without imposing extra burdens on the computation and the communication cost. In 2002, Baek
et al. [18] introduced the formal security proof model for a signcryption scheme in the random oracle model. The next year,
Boyen [19] proposed a provably secure identity-based signcryption scheme with ciphertext anonymity. In 2005, Hwang
et al. [20] proposed an elliptic curve based signcryption scheme with forward secrecy for facilitating the gradually widely
used mobile applications.
Recently, bilinear pairing cryptosystems fromelliptic curves have received great attention in cryptography [21–25].Many
researchers [26–33] also dedicate themselves to the construction of pairing-based signcryption schemes. Some [28–30,33]
of them are constructed to handle the issue of proxy delegation. Such schemes have realistic applicability and are suitable
for the confidential transactions, e.g., on-line proxy auctions or contract signing by an authorized proxy signer. Consider
the application such as a bank account owned by a busy boss. To withdraw money from his saving account, the boss must
sign a withdrawal slip which can only be verified by the bank teller. In case that this boss is unable to sign personally, he
can delegate his signing power to a proxy signer who can legitimately conduct transactions on behalf of him. However, the
above mentioned proxy signcryption schemes cannot provide strong and complete security proofs in either random oracle
or standard model.
1.1. Our contribution
Elaborating on the merits of signcryption schemes and proxy signature schemes, we adopt the partial delegation with
warrant to propose an efficient proxy signcryption scheme based on bilinear pairings in this paper. The proposed scheme
only requires four bilinear pairing operations for the entire protocol, which benefits to practical implementation. Consider
the realistic situation that an original signer might delegate his signing power to different proxy signers for various
transactions. In this case, our scheme with optimal computational efficiency for the original signer would be a better
alternative, since our delegation process involves no bilinear pairing computation which is regarded as the most time-
consuming operation. When the case of a later dispute over repudiation occurs, the designated recipient is capable of
announcing the ordinary proxy signature to convince anyone of the proxy signer’s dishonesty. Note that the conversion takes
no extra computational efforts, since the ordinary proxy signature will be derived during the decryption and verification
process. Compared with related works, the proposed scheme not only has lower computational costs, but also provides
better functionalities. Additionally, we also prove that the proposed scheme achieves the IND-CCA2 and the EF-CMA security
in the random oracle model.
2. Preliminaries
For facilitating the reader with the following description, in this section, we first state involved parties and then review
some security notions.
2.1. Involved parties
A proxy signcryption scheme mainly has three involved parties: an original signer, a proxy signer and a designated
recipient. All parties are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTM). The original signer delegates his signing
power to the proxy signer by issuing the proxy credential. After that, the latter can generate a signcryptedmessage on behalf




A proxy signcryption scheme is correct if the proxy signer can generate a valid signcrypted message on behalf of the
original signer and only the designated recipient is capable of decrypting it and verifying the proxy signature.
Bilinear pairings [34]
Let (G1,+) and (G2,×) denote two groups of the same prime order q and e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear map which
satisfies the following properties:
(i) Bilinearity:
e(P1 + P2,Q ) = e(P1,Q )e(P2,Q );
e(P,Q1 + Q2) = e(P,Q1)e(P,Q2).
1852 H.-Y. Lin et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 1850–1858
(ii) Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G1, then e(P, P) is a generator of G2.
(iii) Computability: Given P,Q ∈ G1, the value of e(P,Q ) can be efficiently computed by a polynomial-time algorithm.
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem; BDHP
The BDHP is, given an instance (P, A, B, C) ∈ G41 where P is a generator, A = aP, B = bP and C = cP for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ,
to compute e(P, P)abc ∈ G2.
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) Assumption
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial Q (·) and all sufficiently large k, the
algorithmA can solve the BDHP with an advantage at most 1/Q (k), i.e.,
Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP) = e(P, P)abc; a, b, c ← Z∗q , (P, aP, bP, cP)← G41 ] ≤ 1/Q (k).
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance and over the random choices ofA.
Definition 1. The (t, ε)-BDH assumption holds if there exists no polynomial-time adversary that can solve the BDHP in time
at most t and with the advantage ε.
3. Formal model of the proposed scheme
This section addresses the formal model of our proposed proxy signcryption scheme and its security model.
3.1. Proxy signcryption scheme
The proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup: Taking as input 1kwhere k is a security parameter, the algorithm generates the system’s public parameters params.
– Proxy-Credential-Generation (PCG): The PCG algorithm takes as input the private key of original signer and outputs a
corresponding proxy credential for the proxy signer.
– Signcrypted-Message-Generation (SMG): The SMG algorithm takes as input a plaintext m, a proxy credential, the public
key of designated recipient and the private key of proxy signer. It generates a corresponding signcrypted message δ.
– Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV): The SRV algorithm takes as input a signcrypted message δ, the private key of
designated recipient and the public keys of original and proxy signers. It outputs a plaintextm and its converted ordinary
proxy signatureΩ if the signcrypted message δ is valid. Otherwise, an error symbol ű is returned.
3.2. Security model
Two crucial security requirements of the proposed scheme are message confidentiality and unforgeability. We define
two security models for these notions as follows:
Definition 2 (Confidentiality). A proxy signcryption scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of confidentiality
against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if there is no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaryAwith non-negligible advantage in the following game played with a challengerB:
Setup: The challenger B first runs the Setup (1k) algorithm and sends the system’s public parameters params to the
adversaryA.
Phase 1: The adversary A can issue several kinds of queries adaptively, i.e., each query might be based on the result of
previous queries:
– Proxy-Credential-Generation (PCG) queries: A issues a PCG query with respect to the target proxy signer. B returns the
corresponding warrant and its proxy credential.
– Signcrypted-Message-Generation (SMG) queries: A chooses a plaintext m and then B outputs the corresponding
signcrypted message δ toA.
– Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV) queries: On receiving a signcrypted message δ with its warrant sent by A,B
returns a plaintext m and its converted proxy signature Ω if the signcrypted message δ is valid. Otherwise, an error
symbol ű is returned.
Challenge: The adversaryA produces two plaintexts,m0 andm1, of the same length.B flips a coin λ← {0, 1} and generates
a signcrypted message δ∗ formλ. The signcrypted message δ∗ is then delivered toA as a target challenge.
Phase 2: The adversaryA can issue new queries as those in Phase 1, except the SRV query for the target challenge δ∗.
Guess: At the end of the game, A outputs a bit λ′. The adversary A wins this game if λ′ = λ. We define A’s advantage as
Adv(A) = | Pr[λ′ = λ] − 1/2|.
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Definition 3 (Unforgeability). A proxy signcryption scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of unforgeability
against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaryAwith non-negligible advantage in the following game played with a challengerB:
Setup:B first runs the Setup (1k) algorithm and sends the system’s public parameters params to the adversaryA.
Phase 1: The adversaryA adaptively issues PCG and SMG queries as those in Phase 1 of Definition 2.
Forgery: Finally, A arbitrarily chooses a plaintext m and produces a signcrypted message δ∗ which is not outputted by the
SMG query. The adversaryAwins if δ∗ is valid.
4. The proposed scheme
Wepropose an efficient proxy signcryption schemebased onBDHP in this section. Our schemehas optimal computational
efficiency for the original signer, since the delegation process involves no bilinear pairing operation which is considered the
most time-consuming computation. As for the entire protocol, only four pairing operations are required. Details of each
algorithm are described below:
– Setup: Taking as input 1k, the system authority (SA) selects two groups (G1,+) and (G2,×) of the same prime order q
with |q| = k. Let P be a generator of order q over G1, e : G1 × G1 → G2 a bilinear pairing and h1 : {0, 1}k × G1 →
Zq, h2 : G1 → G1 and h3 : G2 × G1 → {0, 1}k collision resistant hash functions. The system publishes params =
{G1,G2, q, P, e, h1, h2, h3}. Each user Ui chooses his private key xi ∈R Zq and computes the corresponding public one as
Yi = xiP .
– Proxy-Credential-Generation (PCG): Let Uo be an original signer delegating his signing power to a proxy signer Up. Uo first
chooses an integer d ∈ Zq to compute
N = dP, (1)
σ = xo + d(mw)mod q, (2)
where mw is the warrant consisting of the identifiers of original signer, proxy signer and designated recipient, the
delegation duration and so on. The proxy credential (σ ,N,mw) are then sent to Up. Upon receiving (σ ,mw,N), Up first
checks its validity by verifying whether
σP = Yo +mwN. (3)
If it does not hold, (σ ,mw,N) is requested to be sent again.
– Signcrypted-Message-Generation (SMG): For signcrypting a chosen plaintext m∈R{0, 1}k on behalf of the original signer
Uo,Up chooses r ∈R Zq to compute
R = rP, (4)
S = r(h1(m, R)+ xp + σ)−1P, (5)
V = e(h2(σYv), xpYv), (6)
X = EV (S), (7)
Y = h3(V , R)⊕m, (8)
and then delivers the warrant mw and the signcrypted message δ = (R, X, Y ,N) to the designated recipient Uv , where
EV denotes the symmetric encryption function with key V .
– Signature-Recovery-and-Verification (SRV): Upon receiving (R, X, Y ,N), Uv first computes
V = e(h2(xv(Yo +mwN)), xvYp), (9)
to recover the plaintextm as
m = h3(V , R)⊕ Y (10)
and checks the redundancy embedded inm. Uv further computes S as
S = DV (X) (11)
and verifies the proxy signature by checking if
e(h1(m, R)P + Yp + Yo +mwN, S) = e(P, R). (12)
Note that DV is the symmetric decryption function with key V .
Since the converted proxy signature Ω = (S, R,N) is derived during the verification process, the designated recipient
Uv can easily announce it together with (m,mw) in case of a later dispute over repudiation. Accordingly, any third party can
check Eq. (12) to realize the proxy signer’s dishonesty.
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5. Security proof and comparison
In this section, we first analyze the security of our proposed scheme and then make a comparison with some previous
works.
5.1. Security proof
We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is correct and achieves the IND-CCA2 and the EF-CMA security in the random
oracle model. We first show that the verification of Eq. (3) works correctly. From the left-hand side of Eq. (3), we have
σP = (xo + d(mw))P (by Eq. (2))
= xoP + d(mw)P
= Yo +mwN (by Eq. (1))
which leads to the right-hand side of Eq. (3).
Upon receiving (R, X, Y ,N) with the warrantmw , the designated recipient can correctly recover the plaintext and verify
the embedded proxy signature with Eq. (12). From the left-hand side of Eq. (12), we have
e(h1(m, R)P + Yp + Yo +mwN, S) = e(h1(m, R)P + Yp + Yo +mwN, r(h1(m, R)+ xp + σ)−1P) (by Eq. (5))
= e((h1(m, R)+ xp + xo + d(mw))P, r(h1(m, R)+ xp
+ xo + d(mw))−1P) (by Eqs. (1) and (2))
= e(P, rP)
= e(P, R) (by Eq. (4))
which leads to the right-hand side of Eq. (12).
We then prove that the proposed scheme achieves the IND-CCA2 and the EF-CMA security in the random oracle model
as Theorems 1 and 2, respectively.
Theorem 1 (Proof of Confidentiality). The proposed scheme is (t, qh1, qh2, qh3, qPCG, qSMG, qSRV, ε)-secure against indistinguisha-
bility under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in the randomoraclemodel if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary that can (t ′, ε′)-break the BDHP, where
ε′ ≥ (q−1h3 )(2ε − qSRV(2−k)),
t ′ ≈ t + tλ(qSMG + 2qSRV).
Here tλ is the time for performing one bilinear pairing operation.
Proof. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can (t, qh1, qh2, qh3, qPCG, qSMG, qSRV, ε)-break the
proposed scheme with non-negligible advantage ε under the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack after running in time at
most t and asking at most qhihi random oracle (for i = 1 to 3), qPCG PCG queries, qSMG SMG queries and qSRV SRV queries.
Thenwe can construct another algorithmB that (t ′, ε′)-breaks the BDHP by takingA as a subroutine. Let all involved parties
and parameters be defined the same as those in Section 4. The objective ofB is to obtain e(P, P)abc by taking (P, aP, bP, cP)
as inputs. In this proof,B simulates a challenger toA in the following game.
Setup: The challenger B runs the Setup (1k) algorithm, sets (Yp = aP, Yv = bP, Yo = wP where w ∈R Zq) and sends the
system’s public parameters params = {G1,G2, q, P, e} along with (Yo, Yp, Yv) to the adversaryA
Phase 1:A issues the following kinds of queries adaptively:
– h1 query: WhenAmakes an h1 query of h1(m, R),B first checks the h1-list for a matched entry. Otherwise,B randomly
chooses v1 ∈ Zq and stores the entry (m, R, v1) into h1-list. Finally,B returns v1 as a result.
– h2 query: WhenAmakes an h2 query of h2 (σYv),B first checks the h2-list for a matched entry. Otherwise,B randomly
chooses an integer v2 ∈ Zq to compute V2 = v2P , stores the entry (σYv, v2, V2) and returns V2 as a result.
– h3 query:WhenAmakes an h3 query of h3(V , R),B first checks the h3-list for a matched entry. Otherwise,B randomly
chooses v3 ∈ {0, 1}k, stores the entry (V , R, v3) and returns v3 as a result.
– PCG queries: When A makes a PCG query for the proxy signer Up,B directly runs the PCG algorithm with his selected
private keyw and returns the corresponding (σ ,mw,N) as a result.
– SMG queries: When A makes an SMG query for a plaintext m,B first obtains the corresponding proxy credential
(σ ,mw,N) by making the PCG query, randomly chooses fresh s, v1 ∈ Zq to compute
S = sP,
R = sv1P + s(aP)+ s(wP)+ smwN,
such that h1(m, R) has never been queried before and then defines v1 = h1(m, R).B further makes an h2 (σ(bP)) query
to get (v2, V2), computes V = e(v2(aP), (bP)) and (X, Y ) as Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively. The signcrypted message
δ = (R, X, Y ,N) andmw are returned as a result.
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– SRV queries: WhenA submits a signcryptedmessage δ = (R, X, Y ,N)withmw,B first searches the h3-list for possible V
using R as an index and computes S = DV (X) andm = v3⊕Y . If one satisfies e(h1(m, R)P+Yp+Yo+mwN, S) = e(P, R),B
returnsm and its converted proxy signatureΩ = (S, R,N). Otherwise,B directly returns the symbolű as a result to signal
that δ is invalid.
Challenge: A generates two plaintexts, m0 and m1, of the same length and sends them to the challenger B. Then B flips a
coin λ← {0, 1} and generates a signcrypted message δ∗ = (R∗, X∗, Y ∗,N∗) formλ as follows:
Step 1 Make a PCG query to obtain (σ ∗,m∗w,N∗);
Step 2 Choose X∗ ∈R G1, v∗3 ∈R{0, 1}k and s, v∗1 , z ∈R Zq;
Step 3 Compute S∗ = sP and R∗ = sv∗1P + s(aP)+ s(wP)+ sm∗wN∗;
Step 4 Store the entry (mλ, R∗, v∗1 ) into h1-list, i.e., implicitly define h1(mλ, R∗) = v∗1 ;
Step 5 Store the entry (σ ∗Yv , null, z(cP)) into h2-list, i.e., implicitly define h2 (σ ∗Yv) = z(cP);
Step 6 Compute Y ∗ = v∗3 ⊕mλ, i.e., implicitly define h3(V ∗, R∗) = v∗3 where V ∗ = e(z(cP), a(bP)) andB does not know it.
Phase 2:A issues new queries as those stated in Phase 1. It is not allowed to request an SRV query for the target challenge
δ∗.
Analysis of the game: Since B has set Yo = wP where w ∈R Zq, he can always return a valid proxy credential for A’s PCG
query. For each SMG query,B also simulates a computationally indistinguishable signcryptedmessage bymanipulating the
h1 random oracle. Therefore, we refer the simulations of PCG and ACG queries to be perfect. Thenwe evaluate the simulation
of SRV queries. It is possible that an SRV query returns the error symbol ű for some valid δ if the corresponding h3 random
oracle has never been asked before. Let SRV_ERR be the event that an SRV query returns ű for a valid δ during the entire
game, SM-V an event that a signcrypted message δ submitted by A is valid, and QH3 the event that the corresponding h3
oracle has ever been asked before. Then we can express the error probability of any SRV query as
Pr[SM-V|¬QH3] ≤ 2−k.
SinceA is allowed to make at most qSRV SRV queries, we can further express the probability of SRV_ERR as
Pr[SRV_ERR] ≤ qSRV(2−k). (13)
Moreover, in the challenge phase, B has returned a simulated δ∗ = (R∗, X∗, Y ∗,N∗) where h2(R∗) = z(cP), which
implies the shared secret V ∗ is implicitly defined as V ∗ = e(z(cP), a(bP)). Let GP be the event that the entire simulation
game is perfect. In Phase 2, if the adversary A never makes the query of h3(V ∗, R∗), the entire simulation game could be
perfect. We denote the event that A does ask an h3(V ∗, R∗) random oracle in Phase 2 by QH∗3 . When the entire simulation
game is perfect,A gains no advantage in guessing λ due to the randomness of the output of the random oracle, i.e.,
Pr[λ′ = λ|GP] = 1/2. (14)
From the expression of Pr[λ′ = λ], we can derive that
Pr[λ′ = λ] = Pr[λ′ = λ|GP] Pr[GP] + Pr[λ′ = λ|¬GP] Pr[¬GP]
≤ (1/2) Pr[GP] + Pr[¬GP] (by Eq. (14))
= (1/2)(1− Pr[¬GP])+ Pr[¬GP]
= (1/2)+ (1/2) Pr[¬GP]. (15)
Besides, we can also derive that
Pr[λ′ = λ] ≥ Pr[λ′ = λ|GP] Pr[GP]
= (1/2)(1− Pr[¬GP])
= (1/2)− (1/2) Pr[¬GP]. (16)
By combining inequalities (15) and (16), we obtain that
| Pr[λ′ = λ] − 1/2| ≤ (1/2) Pr[¬GP]. (17)
Recall that in Definition 2,A’s advantage is defined as Adv(A) = | Pr[λ′ = λ]−1/2|. By assumption,A has non-negligible
probability ε to break the proposed scheme. We therefore have
ε = | Pr[λ′ = λ] − 1/2|
≤ (1/2) Pr[¬GP] (by Eq. (17))
= (1/2)(Pr[QH3∗ ∨ SRV_ERR])
≤ (1/2)(Pr[QH3∗] + Pr[SRV_ERR]).
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Rewriting the above inequality, we get
Pr[QH3∗] ≥ 2ε − Pr[SRV_ERR]
≥ 2ε − qSRV(2−k) (by Eq. (13)).
When the event QH∗3 happens, we claim that V ∗ = e(z(cP), a(bP))will be left in some entry of the h3-list. Consequently,B
would have non-negligible probability
ε′ ≥ (q−1h3 )(2ε − qSRV(2−k))
to solve the BDHP by outputting V ∗z
−1
. The computational time required forB is t ′ ≈ t + tλ(qSMG + 2qSRV). 
Theorem 2 (Proof of Unforgeability). The proposed scheme is (t, qh1, qh2, qh3, qPCG, qSMG, ε)-secure against existential forgery
under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary that can (t ′, ε′)-break the BDHP, where
ε′ ≥ (ε − (qh2 + 1)/2k)/(qh2qh3),
t ′ ≈ t + tλ(qSMG).
Here tλ is the time for performing one bilinear pairing operation.
Proof. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can (t, qh1, qh2, qh3, qPCG, qSMG, ε)-break the proposed
scheme with non-negligible advantage ε under the adaptive chosen-message attack after running in time at most t and
asking at most qhihi random oracle (for i = 1–3), qPCG PCG and qSMG SMG queries. Then we can construct another algorithm
B that (t ′, ε′)-breaks the BDHP by taking A as a subroutine. Let all involved parties and notations be defined the same as
those in Section 4. The objective of B is to obtain e(P, P)abc by taking (P, aP , bP , cP) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a
challenger toA in the following game.
Setup: The challenger B runs the Setup (1k) algorithm, sets (Yp = aP, Yv = bP , Yo = wP where w ∈R Zq) and sends the
system’s public parameters params = {G1,G2, q, P, e} along with (Yo, Yp, Yv) to the adversaryA.
Phase 1:A adaptively asks h1, h2, h3 random oracles, PCG and SMG queries as those defined in Theorem 1. Note that in the
jth h2 random oracle,B directly returns z(cP)where z ∈R Zq.
Forgery: Finally,A outputs a signcrypted message δ∗ = (R∗, X∗, Y ∗,N∗) andm∗w for his arbitrarily chosen plaintextm∗. If δ∗
is valid,Awins the game.
Analysis of the game: According to the analyses of Theorem 1, we know that the simulation of each PCG or ACG query
is regarded as perfect. Furthermore, B answers each hi random oracle with a computationally indistinguishable value
without collision. Let SM-V be the event that the forged δ∗ is valid. QH2 and QH3 separately denote that A has ever asks
the corresponding h2 and h3 random oracles. The probability thatA can guess the correct random value without asking h2
or h3 random oracle is not greater than 2−k. Since A has non-negligible advantage ε to break the proposed scheme under
adaptive chosen-message attacks, we have
ε = Pr[SM-V]
= Pr[SM-V|QH2] + Pr[SM-V|¬QH2]
≤ Pr[SM-V|QH2] + 2−k
= Pr[SM-V|(QH2 ∧ QH3)] + Pr[SM-V|(QH2 ∧ ¬QH3)] + 2−k
≤ Pr[SM-V|(QH2 ∧ QH3)] + qh2(2−k)+ 2−k.
Further writing the above inequality, we can also obtain
Pr[SM-V|(QH2 ∧ QH3)] ≥ ε − (qh2 + 1)/2k.
Seeing that in the jth h2 random oracle,B directly returned z(cP) as the result, we claim that when the event (SM-V|(QH2∧
QH3)) occurs,B would have the probability of (qh2qh3)−1 to output
V ∗z
−1 = e(P, P)abc
from some entry of h3-list. Therefore, we can express the probability ofB to solve the BDHP as
ε′ ≥ (ε − (qh2 + 1)/2k)/(qh2qh3).
The running time required forB is t ′ ≈ t + tλ(qSMG). 
According to Theorem 2, the proposed scheme is secure against existential forgery attacks. That is, the signcrypted
message cannot be forged and the delegated proxy signer cannot repudiate having generated his ciphertext. Hence, we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement of non-repudiation.
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Table 1
Comparisons of functionalities and security proofs.
Item Scheme
EA DCZ LC WC DC Ours
Pairing-based scheme O O O O O O
Resist key-compromised attack × × O O O O
Proxy delegation O O O O × O
Partial delegation with warrant × O O O × O
Public verifiability × O O O O O
No conversion cost × O O O O O
Complete proof of confidentiality × × × × O O
Complete proof of unforgeability × × × × O O
Table 2
Comparisons of computational costs in number of bilinear pairing operations.
Item Scheme
EA DCZ LC WC Ours
#Bilinear pairing for PCG phase 3 3 3 2 0
#Bilinear pairing for SMG phase 2 2 2 1 1
#Bilinear pairing for SRV phase 7 4 8 3 3
Total costs for the entire scheme 12 9 13 6 4
5.2. Comparison
We compare the proposed scheme with some previous works including the Elkamchouchi–Abouelseoud [29] (EA for
short), Duan et al.’s (DCZ for short) [28], the Li–Chen (LC for short) [30], theWang–Cao (WC for short) [33] and the Duan–Cao
(DC for short) [27] schemes. Table 1 summarizes the comparison in terms of functionalities and security proofs. Note that
the Elkamchouchi–Abouelseoud and Duan et al.’s schemes are vulnerable to the key-compromised attack, i.e., once the
private key of proxy signer is compromised, an attacker can easily recover the plaintextwithout the knowledge of designated
recipient’s private key. From this table, it can be seen that the proposed scheme not only provides better functionalities, but
also has provable security.
Table 2 further summarizes the comparison of computational costs in number of the most time-consuming operations,
i.e., the bilinear pairing computations. In practice, assume that the elliptic curve E/F3163 defined by the equation y
2 =
x3 − x + 1 is adopted in the compared schemes. According to the best result in [34], one pairing operation still requires
about 11110 multiplications in F3163 . To obtain fair comparison results, the Duan–Cao scheme is excluded from Table 2,
since their scheme does not have the property of proxy delegation. From the comparison results shown in Table 2, one can
see that the proposed scheme outperforms compared ones and hence is more suitable for practical implementation.
6. Conclusions
To extend the application of traditional signcryption schemes, in this paper, we adopt the partial delegationwithwarrant
to propose an efficient proxy signcryption scheme based on pairings. Preserving the property of traditional signcryption
schemes that only the designated recipient can decrypt the signcrypted message and verify the signature, the proposed
scheme further provides the designated recipient with the ability to easily reveal the ordinary proxy signature for public
verification if necessary. Furthermore, the proofs of security requirement for confidentiality against indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and that for unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive
chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) are given in the random oracle model. As compared with related works, the proposed
scheme earns more computational efficiency and provides better functionalities.
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